The second-tier trap: Theory and experimental evidence by Kim, Duk Gyoo
The Second-Tier Trap: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Duk Gyoo Kim∗
Current version: April 6, 2017
Abstract
Winner-take-all competitions can lead to the person in the second-tier (middle-tier) environ-
ment having the worst expected payoff when players exclusively choose their environment and
exert effort before their random, heterogeneous environmental supports are realized. The tiers
are defined by the ranks in pairwise competitions. The second-tier trap (STT) is a situation in
which a player from the second-tier environment has the worst expected payoff even though his
expected environmental support is strictly greater than that of the third-tier player. A sufficient
condition for the STT is that the ex-ante advantages, the winning probabilities when all the
players exert the same amount of effort regardless of their environment, be the same for those
two environments. I claim that this sufficient condition for the STT is so weak that players
can easily be tempted to choose the second-tier environment, which is the wrong decision. Lab
experiments strongly support this claim.
Key words contests, all-pay auction, Lazear–Rosen model, laboratory experiments
JEL classification C72, C91, D81
1 Introduction
I consider a winner-take-all competition among n players in which their “environmental
supports” are random and heterogeneous. In the first phase, players exclusively choose an
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environment to which they want to belong, based on some informative statistics about the envi-
ronments. In the second phase, they choose their effort level, and after that their environmental
support is realized. The second phase of the game can be interpreted in a manner similar to
that of Lazear and Rosen (1981), namely, that the environmental support is the random or luck
component. It is well known that in a many-player competition with a winner-take-all payoff
structure, the variance of the environmental support (or of some random component in other
contexts) can significantly affect the players’ strategies and payoffs in equilibrium, and therefore
it is straightforward to predict that the ranking of the expected environmental supports may
not be consistent with the ranking of the expected utilities of the players.
My main research question was what ex-ante information is sufficient for choosing an opti-
mal (i.e., expected payoff maximizing) environment, and whether economic agents will indeed
choose the optimal environment. I was particularly interested in the situation where the best en-
vironment is not allowed to be chosen, so agents are asked to pick the second-best environment.
The second-tier trap (STT) is a situation in which a player from the second-tier environment
(the one with the second-largest expected environmental support) has the worst expected payoff
even though his expected environmental support is strictly greater than that of the third-tier
player. That is, when the best environment is unavailable and a sufficient condition for the
STT is observed, players should choose the third-tier environment. I call this situation the STT
because players are easily tempted to choose the second-tier environment over the second-best
environment. The sufficient condition for the STT is so weak that even a sophisticated player
could mistake the second-tier environment for the second-best one.
Though the model has the form of a competition among many identical players who ex-
clusively choose one environment each, it would also serve as counterfactual analysis of an
individual’s irreversible life choices. We often encounter a situation where we must choose one
of several exclusive options that will affect our life for a substantial period of time thereafter.
Which college should I go to? Which major? Which career? Which social group? Even more
challengingly, in several situations where someone else has chosen the most preferable option,
or we are not accepted for that option, we have to choose one of the remaining options. The
situation where the best choice is taken by someone else does not necessarily imply a difference
in the abilities of those individuals (Frank, 2016). Identical n-player rank-order tournaments
and Tullock contests theoretically predict the following: Every player exerts the same amount
of effort, and one of them is randomly chosen to be the winner. In this case, we cannot say the
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winner is better than the others or that the winner exerts more effort. Indeed, as the number
of competitors gets larger, it is more likely that the first-best option has already been taken by
someone else, and so the other players have to choose the best option still available to them.
This paper provides a novel approach to addressing this issue in the form of a two-stage com-
petition: Just like all the life choices, a decision maker chooses an exclusive environment, and
chooses an effort level to compete with other “counterfactual selves” who chose the road not
taken. Since considering many selves, instead of many identical players, does not change the
model and its predictions, all “identical players” in this paper may be thought of “counterfac-
tual selves.” However, for the sake of expositional simplicity, consistency with the laboratory
experiment design, and potential relation to the existing literature, I maintain the interpretation
of the model as a many-player competition.
In the first stage of my model, identical players reveal their preferences of environments
and are assigned to environments according those preferences. If two or more players have the
same preference, they are randomly assigned to different environments with equal probability.
Alternatively, this could be thought of as a random ordering of identical players who take turns
choosing the environment to which they want to belong. The player’s environmental support
is randomly drawn from an environment-specific support distribution at the end of the game.
The support distribution can be interpreted as a different market situation that each player
faces;1 a characteristic of the group, such as a team, school, career, or social identity (Akerlof
and Kranton, 2005); or simply a distribution of the luck component. Players know the support
distributions, and are able to calculate some informative statistics, such as means, variances, and
ex-ante advantages, at the time they are given a choice of environments. The ex-ante advantage
of an environment is defined as the winning probability of a player from that environment when
all the players exert the same amount of effort. In the second stage, players choose their level
of effort, and environmental supports (accordingly, payoffs) are realized at the end of the game.
The player with the highest output, which is the sum of the effort and the realization of the
environmental support, wins the prize. Equilibrium payoffs are determined by the amount of
the prize, the winning probability, and the cost of the effort.
1As an example of many-player competition, consider a situation where one of three workers will be promoted
based on their outputs (the sum of their effort and the growth rate of the market), and the three workers will be in
charge of separate international markets whose potential growth rates are random and heterogeneous. Before choosing
their effort level, they have to exclusively choose one market whose growth rate is not yet realized. As an example
of counterfactual analysis, consider a situation where a high school senior chooses a major for college. She tries to
maximize her well-being (expected payoff minus cost of effort) but does not know which major will enable her to get
a job that pays the most four years later.
3
The tiers are defined according to the ranks of the expected environmental supports. Player
i is said to be in a higher tier than player j if E(θi) > E(θj). This definition is well justified,
because equilibrium payoffs are consistent with tiers in pairwise competitions (Proposition 1).
In three-player competitions, a sufficient condition for a player to attain a larger expected payoff
by choosing the third-tier environment (the third-best environment in terms of the expected
support) over the second-tier one is that the third-tier environment’s ex-ante advantage be at
least as large as that of the second-tier environment (Proposition 3). Since this is a sufficient
condition, the second-best environment could be the third-tier environment even if the second-
tier environment has a higher mean and a (slightly) higher ex-ante advantage than the third-tier
one. I claim that players can easily be tempted to choose the second-tier environment when
they are asked to choose the second-best environment, even though that would cause them to
fall into the STT.
I conducted laboratory experiments to observe how subjects choose their environment to
maximize their expected payoff. In each session, experiment participants played 10 rounds of
rank-order tournament games. In the first stage of the game, each subject exclusively chose
one of three environments, which were described by nonidentical uniform distributions. In the
second stage, they chose an individual investment level on being given the attendant costs. At
the end of the game, an environmental support was randomly drawn from the distribution, and
payoffs were based on the rank of the outputs, where the output of each player was the sum of
his environmental support and his individual investment. They chose one of three environments
in four of the rounds (which I call the unrestricted rounds), and they were restricted to choose
an environment other than the first-tier one in the other six rounds (the restricted rounds).
None of the subjects chose the environment that maximized their expected payoffs in all the
restricted rounds, while 52.57% of subjects chose the optimal environment in all the unrestricted
rounds. On average, subjects choose the optimal environment in 28.67% of the restricted rounds
and in 75.57% of the unrestricted rounds. Interestingly, those who always chose the optimal
environment in the unrestricted rounds were more likely to fall into the STT. On average, they
chose the optimal environment in only 16.67% of the restricted rounds. In the follow-up survey,
most of the subjects indicated that they were more confident about their choices of environments
than their choices of investment levels, and found that choosing the environment was an easier
task than choosing an individual investment level.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the following subsection I discuss the related
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literature. Section 2 presents the model, section 3 shows the relationship between the ranks
of the expected environmental supports and the ranks of the equilibrium payoffs, and section
4 describes the experimental design and procedures. The experimental results are reported in
section 5, and section 6 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
Following Lazear and Rosen (1981), many researchers have analyzed contests and all-pay
auctions of asymmetric agents. This paper, from the model perspective, contributes to this lit-
erature. Some authors, including Krishna and Morgan (1998) and Moldovanu and Sela (2001),
assume that ability includes some random components and that differences in ability are cap-
tured by the different and deterministic costs of effort. Nevertheless, they assume that the
ability distributions are identical. Dubey (2013) takes stochastic ability and incomplete infor-
mation into account. Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2014) have a model in which abilities work
in the same manner as environmental supports in this paper, but abilities are private informa-
tion at the time that effort is made. The main differences between the existing literature and
this paper are that all agents decide the level of effort before the random component is realized
and the ability distributions are not identical across agents. To the best of my knowledge, there
have been no models of all-pay auctions among three players that involve random environmental
supports which are non-identical in terms of both means and variances. Therefore, the model
presented here can be understood as a generalization of previous models. Once players are
exclusively assigned to the environments in the first stage, the second stage of the model has
a form similar to that of the Lazear–Rosen rank-order tournament model (Lazear and Rosen,
1981) and its descendants. Though rent-seeking behavior models are not the focus of my model,
the equilibrium allocation of models presented in Nti (1999), Stein (2002), Allard (1988), and
Tullock (1980) can be described as solutions of special cases of my model.2
Another difference between this paper and the existing literature is that there are more
than two agents. When allowing for asymmetries among agents, most of the literature on all-
pay auction contests assumes that there are exactly two players as in Amann and Leininger
(1996) or many ex-ante identical players as in Krishna and Morgan (1997). Some recent studies
2If the realizations of the environmental supports were publicly known before choosing the level of effort, then my
model would reduce to the models presented in Nti (1999), Stein (2002), and Allard (1988). In this case, the ranks
of the supports (abilities, or costs in some contexts) would yield a strong prediction of the ranks of the equilibrium
payoffs. Moreover, if the environmental supports of all the players were non-stochastic and identical, then a player’s
probability of winning would be captured simply by the players’ individual levels of effort relative to the aggregate
sum of their efforts, which is a basic model provided by Tullock (1980).
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consider more than two agents. Siegel (2009) studies many-player all-pay contests to capture
general asymmetries among contestants and analyzes the players’ participation. Parreiras and
Rubinchik (2010) consider three bidders in contests where participants have distinct risk pref-
erences, and find that these differences can cause some players to drop out. Kirkegaard (2013)
studies an incomplete information model among three groups where a “strong” group is hand-
icapped, in order to allow for affirmative action, and shows that some of the players in the
favored group may become worse off when the favored group is diverse. The thrust of this pa-
per is similar to that of Kirkegaard (2013), since it shows that properties of two-bidder contests
may not necessarily extend to many-bidder contests.
An analogue of this model is one where the environmental support distributions represent
risks: The unrealized supports with the same mean can be represented by error terms with
different variances. In this regard, this paper extends Hvide (2002), where two players with
the same ability choose effort and risk levels; Kra¨kel and Sliwka (2004), where two players with
different abilities choose effort and risk levels; and Gilpatric (2009), where three players in the
contest choose one of the error terms, whose means are all 0 but whose variances vary. A
fundamental difference between this paper and those studies is that the means of the support
distributions are different and two players cannot choose the same distribution. When the
support distributions represent only risks, and if players do not pay a penalty for low output,
it is always optimal for them to choose a higher risk. This may not be the case when there
is another support distribution which has a smaller variance but a higher mean. While the
previous studies were about choices between effort and luck (risk), this study is more about
choices between “higher mean and smaller variance” and “smaller mean and higher variance.”
A large number of studies on competitions have used lab experiments (Bull, Schotter, and
Weigelt, 1987; Schotter and Weigelt, 1992; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2011; Agranov and Tergi-
man, 2013), including many studies reviewed above.3 However, the problem of exclusively
choosing one of a finite set of heterogeneous supporting environments for a competition has not
been considered, despite its importance. In many realistic situations, especially when making
life choices, we first choose an environment which will support our effort, and those support-
ing environments do not necessarily have the same mean. Though the overall methodology of
my laboratory experiments resembles that of Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006), the goal of my
experiments was to observe whether players can choose the environment that maximizes the
3For an extensive review of the experimental literature on contests, rank-order tournaments, and all-pay auctions,
see Dechenaux, Kovenock, and Sheremeta (2014).
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expected payoff under complete information.4
2 The Model
Consider a two-stage game with n ∈ {2, 3} identical players indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ≡ N ,
where the players compete for a prize. In the first stage, each player reveals his preference of n
heterogeneous environments (e.g., n markets, n schools, or n careers) with a single-dimensional
characteristic that randomly affects the outputs of the players. Throughout this paper, I call
this characteristic an “environmental support” in that a player’s choice of environment may
provide benefits (or impose penalties) over and above those that stem from that player’s effort.
For example, every school may adopt different pedagogics. After students are disciplined in a
particular academic environment, they may be randomly affected by the values emphasized by
that school when they face a competitive job market. Let Gi denote the continuous cumulative
distribution for environment i’s support, θi. Θi denotes the support of θi, where I assume that
Θi = R unless otherwise noted. Assume further that the probability density function for the
support due to environment i, gi, is unimodal and symmetric and has finite moments. With a
slight abuse of terminology, I say that environment i is where player i belongs.
In the first stage, players know the support distributions and are able to calculate some
informative statistics: means (E(θi)) and ex-ante advantages (Ai).
5 The ex-ante advantage of
environment i is defined as the winning probability of the player from environment i when all
the players exert the same amount of effort, that is,
Ai =
∫ ∏
j 6=i
Gj(θ)
 gi(θ)dθ, i = 1, . . . , n. (1)
Since the same amount of effort neutralizes changes in the winning probabilities of all the
players, the ex-ante advantages can be calculated by setting the effort made by every player to
0. I believe means and ex-ante advantages are, respectively, the first summary statistics when
subjects look at each distribution separately and all distributions jointly. Once the players reveal
their preferences, they are exclusively assigned to different environments. I assume the players
4The goal of my experiments is similar to that of Nieken (2010) in the sense that she allows subjects in two-player
competitions to choose a variance for noise distributions, and finds that subjects did not choose the distribution with
the higher variance, that is, the optimal distribution.
5If all the distributions are known and the players are rational, they will be able to calculate all the existing
statistics which summarize the distributions. I specify their ability to calculate the means and ex-ante advantages,
because I am considering the possibility of extending this model to one with bounded rationality.
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are identical, so all rational players will have the same preference order. Since identical players
have identical preferences for environments, they are assigned randomly with equal probability.6
Alternatively, this setup could be thought of as a random ordering of identical players who take
turns choosing the environment to which they want to belong.
In the second stage, players choose an effort level ei ≥ 0. The winner will receive a finite
prize w > 0, and the others will receive nothing. The probability of winning is determined by
a player’s output, ei + θˆi, the sum of the effort level and the realization of the support due
to environment i. Player i’s effort costs him c(ei), where c(·) is a strictly increasing, twice
continuously differentiable convex function. Player i’s reward, Ri, is determined as follows:
Ri(ei|θˆi, θˆ−i, e−i) =

w if ei + θˆi = maxj∈N{ej + θˆj},
0 otherwise,
(2)
where the subscript −i refers to all the players except i.7 Each player’s objective is to maximize
EUi(ei|θi, θ−i, e−i) ≡ E[Ri(ei|θi, θ−i, e−i)]− c(ei). (3)
Note that exertion of a greater amount of effort will increase the probability of winning but will
also increase the cost of the effort. After all players choose their level of effort, their payoffs are
determined. Figure 1 summarizes the timing of events.
Players reveal
preferences of
environments.
Players are
assigned to
environments.
Players
choose level
of effort.
Abilities and
payoffs are
realized.
the first stage the second stage
Figure 1: Sequence of Events in the Two-Stage Game
My first goal was to find a non-cooperative equilibrium for the second stage of the game.
Gj(θ+ ei − ej) is the probability that player j’s realization of environmental support plus ej is
6This first stage is fairly simple, but it could allow for the possibility of adopting more general environments
and preference matching algorithms in the manner of Gale and Shapley (1962). Though the model can be directly
interpreted as one in which the number of environments is equal to the number of agents, I do not mean to impose
such a severe restriction. Rather, I consider a situation where all other candidate–environment pairs have cleared the
market and each of the three remaining candidates looks for an environment that has one spot left.
7A tie-break rule is unnecessary, because a tie will almost surely not occur.
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less than player i’s output. Then the best response for player i, BRi(e−i), will solve
BRi(e−i) ∈ arg max
ei≥0
w
∫ ∏
j 6=i
Gj(θˆ + ei − ej)
 gi(θˆ)dθˆ − c(ei), (4)
where
∫ [∏
j 6=iGj(θˆ + ei − ej)
]
gi(θˆ)dθˆ ≡ Pi(ei|e−i) is the probability that player i wins when
the effort choice is ei, given G−i and e−i. Note that when the realization of support is θˆ, player
i’s winning probability is equal to the product of the probabilities that all the other players’
realizations of support θˆ−i given e−i are less than player i’s realization of output. Since Gj(·)
is a nondecreasing function whose lower limit is 0 and upper limit is 1, Pi(ei|e−i) also has these
properties: Pi(ei|e−i) is nondecreasing in ei, Pi(0|e−i) ≥ 0 (> 0 when Gj(x) > 0 for all x), and
limei→∞ Pi(ei|e−i) = 1. The winning probability for player i is nondecreasing in ei and bounded
above by 1.
Since support is random when players choose their level of effort, the effort choice ei acts as
a location shift parameter that shifts the support distribution of player i’s environment. The
best response of player i is therefore determined by the amount of the location shift, given the
other players’ support distributions and location shifts.
The optimal choices of environment and effort can be described as a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium. In the second stage, a Nash equilibrium is a profile of effort choices, e∗ =
(e∗1, . . . , e∗n), such that e∗i ∈ BRi(e∗−i) for all i. Note that limej→∞BRi(e−i) = 0 for every
j 6= i, because if any contestant j chooses a sufficiently large level of effort, player i will not
be compensated for the cost of any positive amount of effort.8 By Berge’s maximum theorem,
BRi(e−i) is upper-semi continuous. Since the effort choice is always nonnegative, a pure strat-
egy Nash equilibrium always exists for this game.9 In the first stage, the players reveal their
preferences of environments according to the order of the expected payoffs in equilibrium.
3 Analysis
In this section, I focus mainly on analysis of the second stage. Because of the assumption
that all the players have identical and rational preferences of environments according to the
expected payoffs, the first stage of the problem becomes trivial.
8Suppose, for example, that the supports for all the players are drawn from the same distribution. If player i
chooses ei ≥ c−1(w), then the best response for all the other players is 0.
9See Appendix A for an existence proof.
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3.1 A Two-Player Competition
I rank the environments by the expected supports of the distributions to check whether the
ranks of the expected supports predict those of the equilibrium payoffs. Player i is said to be in
a higher tier than player j if E(θi) > E(θj).
10 This definition of tiers is well justified, because
the tiers are a strong predictor of the ranks of the equilibrium payoffs and the ranks of the effort
levels in a pairwise competition. In a two-stage game, if players know only the expectations of
the supports in the first stage, revealing preferences based on those expectations is optimal.
Proposition 1. Suppose n = 2 and (e∗1, e∗2) is an equilibrium. Then E(θ1) > E(θ2) if and only
if EU∗1 (e∗1|θ1, θ2, e∗2) > EU∗2 (e∗2|θ2, θ1, e∗1). If E(θ1) > E(θ2), e∗1 ≥ e∗2 in any equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 is intuitive when we consider a shift of the location parameter, θ1
d
= θ2 + x,
for a deterministic x > 0, so that E(θ1) − E(θ2) = x > 0. Then E[R1(e∗1|θ1, θ2, e∗2)] − c(e∗1) >
E[R2(e
∗
2|θ2, θ1, e∗1)]−c(e∗2), because the first-tier player has already been given a positive amount
of “effort,” x, for free. Now if E[R1(e
∗
1|θ1, θ2, e∗2)] − c(e∗1) > E[R2(e∗2|θ2, θ1, e∗1)] − c(e∗2), then it
cannot be the case that E(θ2) ≥ E(θ1). For if E(θ2) ≥ E(θ1), then (e∗1, e∗2) is not an equilibrium,
because for player 2, e∗1 is affordable and player 2’s expected payoff can be at least as large as
that of player 1 by choosing e∗1. One obvious equilibrium is at e∗1 = e∗2,11 but uniqueness of
equilibrium is not guaranteed.
Proposition 1 has two implications. First, the second and higher moments of the support dis-
tributions are irrelevant in determining the ranks of the expected payoffs in a pairwise competi-
tion; what matters is only the expectations of the supports. Second, the binary relation E(θi) >
E(θi+1) implies transitivity of the equilibrium payoffs: If EU
∗
1 (e
∗
1|θ1, θ2, e∗2) > EU∗2 (e∗2|θ2, θ1, e∗1)
and EU∗2 (e∗2|θ2, θ3, e∗3) > EU∗3 (e∗3|θ3, θ2, e∗2), then EU∗1 (e∗1|θ1, θ3, e∗3) > EU∗3 (e∗3|θ3, θ1, e∗1). Thus,
the definition of tiers is justified because it reveals the ranks of the equilibrium payoffs in a
pairwise competition directly. Note also that the higher-tier player will not exert less effort
than the lower-tier player in any equilibrium.
10Note that the definition of tier considers neither the higher moments of the distributions nor the players’ effort
choices. In addition, the fact that player 1 is in a higher tier than player 2 does not necessarily imply that θ1 first-
order stochastically dominates θ2. For example, if θ1 ∼ U [2, 4] and θ2 ∼ U [0, 5], where U [a, b] is a uniform distribution
between a and b, then player 1 is in a higher tier than player 2, even though the variance and the maximum possible
support of the second tier are greater than those of the first tier.
11The first-order condition (FOC) for player i is
∫
gj(θ + ei − e∗j )gi(θ)dθ − c′(ei) = 0. Similarly the FOC for player
j is
∫
gi(θ + ej − e∗i )gj(θ)dθ − c′(ej) = 0. When ei = e∗ = ej , both FOCs are satisfied.
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Suppose now the ranks of the environments are determined by a different statistic of the
environments, namely, their ex-ante advantages. The ex-ante advantage of environment i, Ai,
is calculated by (1). For example, if θ1 = 3 and θ2 ∼ U [0, 4], then A1 = 3/4 and A2 = 1/4.
In a two-player competition, the ranks of the ex-ante advantages are consistent with the ranks
of the expected environmental supports,12 and thus, by Proposition 1, they are consistent with
the equilibrium payoffs as well as with the equilibrium effort levels.
Since the means and the ex-ante advantages convey sufficient information about the ranks
of the expected payoffs, the players can simply reveal preferences according to the tiers in the
first stage. Whether they have complete information of the support distributions is irrelevant.
3.2 A Three-Player Competition
In a three-player competition, the ranks of the expected supports can be inconsistent with
the ranks of the equilibrium payoffs and with the ranks of the ex-ante advantages. It is well
known that the variances of the support distributions are a significant factor in the ranks of the
equilibrium payoffs, so this claim is straightforward. At this point, I provide several numerical
examples in which c(e) is set to e2, for two purposes: to observe some regularities and to
illustrate setups similar to those used in the laboratory experiments. To minimize unnecessary
complexity, all the examples have a unique equilibrium. Consider Example 1, shown in Table
1. If θ1 = 5, θ2 ∼ U [3, 6], and θ3 ∼ U [0.5, 7.5], then E(θ1) > E(θ2) > E(θ3).13 However, the
ex-ante advantage and the equilibrium payoff for player 2 are smaller than those for player 3.
Example 1 Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Rank
θi 5 U [3, 6] U [0.5, 7.5] -
E(θi) 5 4.5 4 E(θ1) > E(θ2) > E(θ3)
Ai 0.4286 0.2481 0.3333 A1 > A3 > A2
e∗i (when w = 1) 0.2332 0.1324 0.0714 e
∗
1 > e
∗
2 > e
∗
3
EU∗i (e
∗
i |Θ, e∗−i) 0.4120 0.2013 0.3097 EU∗1 > EU∗3 > EU∗2
Table 1: Tiers6⇒Ranks of the equilibrium payoffs. Tiers6⇒Ranks of the ex-ante advantages.
The ranks of the ex-ante advantages also do not predict the ranks of the equilibrium payoffs.
When θ1 = 5, θ2 ∼ U [3, 6], and θ3 ∼ U [0.5, 6.8], as shown in Table 2, A1 > A2 > A3, but
still the STT arises. That is, the second-tier player is trapped despite obviously being better
than the third-tier player in the pairwise competition, but is the worst in terms of the expected
12See Lemma 1 in Appendix A.
13I set θ1 to a constant for convenience. The main result is independent of this simplification.
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equilibrium payoff in a three-player competition, even though the second-tier player exerts more
effort than the third-tier player.
Example 2 Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Rank
θi 5 U [3, 6] U [0.5, 6.8] -
E(θi) 5 4.5 3.65 E(θ1) > E(θ2) > E(θ3)
Ai 0.4762 0.2646 0.2593 A1 > A2 > A3
e∗i (when w = 1) 0.2620 0.1473 0.0794 e
∗
1 > e
∗
2 > e
∗
3
EU∗i (e
∗
i |Θ, e∗−i) 0.4553 0.2184 0.2297 EU∗1 > EU∗3 > EU∗2
Table 2: Ranks of the ex-ante advantages 6⇒Ranks of the equilibrium payoffs.
Greater effort on the part of the second-tier player does not necessarily cause him to have
a lower equilibrium payoff. The second-tier player always has a higher equilibrium payoff with
a higher level of effort in the pairwise competition. This is also true in many cases in a three-
player competition, as shown in the example in Table 3. In addition, the ranks of the equilibrium
effort choices cannot be predicted by the tiers or by the ex-ante advantages. To summarize,
unlike a two-player competition, the tiers can be inconsistent with the ex-ante advantages, and
neither the tiers nor the ex-ante advantages reveal the order of the equilibrium payoffs or of the
equilibrium effort levels.
Example 3 Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Rank
θi 5 U [3, 6] U [1.6, 6.4] -
E(θi) 5 4.5 4 E(θ1) > E(θ2) > E(θ3)
Ai 0.4722 0.2708 0.2569 A1 > A2 > A3
e∗i (when w = 1) 0.2599 0.1545 0.1042 e
∗
1 > e
∗
2 > e
∗
3
EU∗i (e
∗
i |Θ, e∗−i) 0.4523 0.2248 0.2206 EU∗1 > EU∗2 > EU∗3
Table 3: Greater effort of the second-tier player does not cause a lower equilibrium payoff.
One useful observation can be obtained by a comparison of Examples 1 and 3, which is
summarized in Table 4. Note that U [0.5, 7.5] is a mean-preserving spread of U [1.6, 6.4]. If the
variance of the third-tier environment gets larger, the ex-ante advantage of this environment
will also get larger, while the ex-ante advantages of the other environments will get smaller.
This is because the third-tier player has more of a possibility for a higher realization of sup-
port.14 Every player’s equilibrium effort choice will decrease in such a scenario, because the
increased uncertainty in the environmental support will dilute the marginal benefit of the effort.
Proposition 2 states how a mean-preserving spread affects equilibrium payoffs.
14Of course, he also has more of a possibility for a lower realization of support, but under the winner-take-all payoff
structure, such possibility does not affect the ex-ante advantage.
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Example 1 and 3 E(θi) Ai ⇒ A′i e∗i ⇒ e∗′i EU∗i ⇒ EU∗′i
θ1 = 5 5.0 0.4772 ⇒ 0.4286 (⇓) 0.2599 ⇒ 0.2332 (⇓) 0.4523 ⇒ 0.4120 (⇓)
θ2 ∼ U [3, 6] 4.5 0.2708 ⇒ 0.2481 (⇓) 0.1545 ⇒ 0.1324 (⇓) 0.2248 ⇒ 0.2013 (⇓)
θ3 ∼ U [1.6, 6.4] 4.0 0.2569 ⇒ 0.3333 (⇑) 0.1042 ⇒ 0.0714 (⇓) 0.2206 ⇒ 0.3097 (⇑)⇒ θ′3 ∼ U [0.5, 7.5]
Table 4: Changes Due to a Mean-Preserving Spread of θ3
Proposition 2. Suppose n = 3 and E(θ1) > E(θ2) > E(θ3). A mean-preserving spread of
θi, i = 2, 3, causes Ai to increase, A−i to decrease, and e∗ = (e∗1, e∗2, e∗3) to decrease. Thus
EU∗i (e
∗
i |θ1, θ2, θ3, e∗−i) increases, but EU∗j (e∗j |θ1, θ2, θ3, e∗−j) does not increase for any j 6= i.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 implies that the ranks of the equilibrium payoffs can be changed as a result
of a change in the variance of the support of a lower-tier environment. In other words, if the
variance of the support of a lower-tier environment does not exceed that of a higher-tier one,
the STT does not arise. V ar(θ3) > V ar(θ2) is a necessary condition for the STT.
Corollary 1. [A necessary condition for the second-tier trap] Consider a positive num-
ber x and assume θ˜3
d
= θ2 − x, so that V ar(θ2) = V ar(θ˜3). Then EU∗2 (e∗2|θ1, θ2, θ˜3, e∗−2) ≥
EU∗3 (e∗3|θ1, θ2, θ˜3, e∗−3). There exists a mean-preserving spread of θ˜3, denoted by θ3, such that
EU∗3 (e∗3|θ1, θ2, θ3, e∗−3) > EU∗2 (e∗2|θ1, θ2, θ3, e∗−2) and V ar(θ3) > V ar(θ˜3) = V ar(θ2).
Proof. See Appendix A.
To understand this necessary condition, consider the case where θ1
d
= θ3 +x and θ2
d
= θ3 + y
for positive numbers x and y with x > y. Then the necessary condition for the STT is not
satisfied, because the θi’s have the same variance. In this case, the first-tier (resp. second-tier)
player will always be better off by keeping the level of effort the same as that of the second-tier
(resp. third-tier) player, because the cost of effort will be the same but the higher-tier player has
the greater chance of winning. With the same level of effort, the rank of the expected payoffs
is mainly determined by the ex-ante advantages, which are always A1 > A2 > A3 in this case.
Thus there is no STT.
The following proposition states a sufficient condition for the existence of the STT.
Proposition 3. [A sufficient condition for the second-tier trap] In a three-player compe-
tition, if E(θ1) > E(θ2) > E(θ3) and A2 = A3, then EU
∗
3 (e
∗
3|θ1, θ2, θ3, e∗−3) ≥ EU∗2 (e∗2|θ1, θ2, θ3, e∗−2).
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Proof: See Appendix A.
When combined with Proposition 2, this sufficient condition implies that the STT can also
arise if A3 > A2. This sufficient condition for the STT can be interpreted in terms of the source
of the ex-ante advantages. A2 = A3 and E(θ2) > E(θ3) jointly imply that the second-tier
player’s ex-ante advantage is driven by the first moment of the support distribution, while the
third-tier player’s ex-ante advantage is driven by the second moment. Intuitively speaking, when
the second-tier environment is not as supportive as the first-tier environment in terms of the
mean, and is not as advantageous as the third-tier environment, it is wise to conclude that the
second-tier environment is not the second-best one. The sufficient condition also implies that the
two statistics, means and ex-ante advantages, are “almost” enough to determine the second-best
environment. The STT can arise even when the second-tier environment has a higher mean and
a (slightly) higher ex-ante advantage than the third-tier environment, as illustrated in Example
2.
3.3 The First Stage
Since the second stage has been analyzed, dealing with the first stage is straightforward.
Indeed, the distinction between the first and the second stages is not theoretically meaningful,
because identical players will have the same preferences for any set of different environments. I
frame the model as a two-stage game so that the model will be a better fit with the experimental
design.
If all the players are rational, then they will prefer the third-tier environment over the second-
tier one in cases where the ex-ante advantages of the second- and the third-tier environments are
similar. Therefore, when a subject is told that one environment is already taken by someone else
and she has to choose from the other available environments, she should choose the second-best
environment. However, I claim that the sufficient condition is less intuitive for na¨ıve decision
makers, and hence that the players can be tempted to choose the second-tier environment over
the second-best one when those are not the same. In particular, if subjects follow their own
rule of thumb, for example, always choose the highest available expected support or the highest
available ex-ante advantage, then they may place themselves in the worst environment even
though they have several options to choose from. One experimentally interesting question is
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how they decide the investment level (the effort choice in the theoretical framework) when they
choose a “wrong” environment.
4 Experimental Design and Procedures
The lab experiments were designed to observe how subjects choose their environment to
maximize their expected payoffs. The experiments were conducted at the Cornell Lab for
Experimental Economics & Decision Research and employed undergraduate students at Cornell
University for ten sessions and graduate students in math-related fields for two sessions.15 A
total of 175 students (154 undergraduates and 21 graduates) participated in an experimental
session, and the average payment, including a reward for participation, was $12.61.
A general description of the experiments is as follows: Each session consisted of ten rounds of
winner-take-all competitions in which the setup was similar to the model presented in section 2.
During the experiments, they earned “points,” which were converted to U.S. dollars at the end
of the experiments at the rate of 1,000 points = 1 USD. In each round, subjects were endowed
with 40 virtual “tokens” and competed with two players (both of which were computers). In
the first phase of each round, they exclusively chose one of several environments, which were
described by uniform distributions, and then in the second phase they chose their investment
level in terms of tokens. At the end of every round, the environmental support for each player
was drawn randomly from the distribution for that player’s chosen environment. The winner
was the one whose output (= individual investment + environmental support) was largest. The
net payoff per round was 1600−X2 + 10(40−X) when the subject won, and −X2 + 10(40−X)
when s/he lost, where X ∈ [0, 40] was the amount of the token investment. In theory, the
reward per round could vary from 0 points (when the subject invested 40 tokens and lost) to
1600 points or 1.6 dollars (when the subject invested 0 tokens and won). The earned points
were accumulated to their account. Subjects were endowed with 7,000 points (the show-up
fee) at the beginning of the experiment, so that subjects would never be constrained in their
investment choices on account of insufficient points in the course of the experiment.
Table 5 summarizes the construction of the experiments. In four of the rounds (2, 4, 7, and
9), subjects chose one of three environments. I call these the unrestricted rounds. In the other six
15In recruiting graduate students, I added the following sentence to the eligibility description: “The study is open to
Cornell graduate students who can calculate mathematical expectations.” I also asked them to fill in their major on
the sign-in form, and all of those who participated were in math-related fields, such as computer science, economics,
operations research, and electrical engineering. The purpose of inviting graduate students was to check whether the
mathematical understanding of the subjects affects the experimental observations.
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rounds, which I call the restricted rounds, they were informed that one environment (the first-tier
environment16) had already been taken by a competitor, and they were to choose one of the two
remaining environments. I was able to identify their preferences of environments by interpreting
their selection in the unrestricted rounds to be their preferred environment and their selection in
the restricted rounds to be their second choice. (I assumed that their first choice in the restricted
rounds would have been the first-tier environment.) To exclude the possibility of choices made as
a result of miscalculation, the mean of each support distribution was displayed. I also provided
a simulator that could be used to calculate the winning probabilities for any contingent set of
effort choices (see Figure 2). Without any additional action on their part, subjects were able to
obtain averages and ex-ante advantages, which were sufficient to determine the environment that
maximized the expected equilibrium payoff in the restricted rounds. A simple calculator and
scratch paper were also provided, and I encouraged subjects to use them whenever necessary.
I acknowledge that providing averages and ex-ante advantages may have been interpreted as
particular rules of thumb and that subjects may simply have used the information provided as
their guide. I also realize that subjects may have found that using the simulator to calculate
expected payoffs was a complicated operation. To address these issues, I also ran supplementary
experiments: one in which 39 subjects were provided with a different simulator—one that could
be used to directly calculate the expected payoffs for any contingent set of effort choices—and
one in which 40 subjects were provided with no simulator and not even the means of the support
distributions were displayed (see Figure 3). Note that when the expected payoff calculator was
provided, subjects would have been able to find a Nash equilibrium by carrying out three or four
operations with the simulators. In neither the restricted rounds nor the unrestricted rounds did
I find any significant differences between results from the main experiment and those from the
supplementary experiments, so I pooled them.17
The support distributions varied from one round to another, but were specified in such a
way that the STT arose in every round, that is, if not given the option of choosing the first-tier
environment, a fully rational agent would choose the third-tier environment even though the
second-tier one may seem more attractive. In rounds 1, 4, and 8, the second-tier environment’s
ex-ante advantage was slightly greater than that of the third-tier one. In rounds 2 and 7, the ex-
16I deliberately did not use terms that could imply anything about ranks or orders. Subjects were simply told that
“one of the environments” had already been taken.
17Under the null hypothesis that environment choices in the restricted rounds observed from the main experiment
and those from the supplementary experiments come from the same distribution, the z-value from the Mann–Whitney
U test was 0.7386 (n1 = 576, n2 = 474, U = 140124, two-tailed). In the unrestricted rounds, the difference was a little
larger but not statistically significant (z-value: 1.8516, n1 = 384, n2 = 316, U = 138170, two-tailed).
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Round Env. A Env. B Env. C
Available Optimal Ranks of Ranks of the exp.
options choice the means eqm. payoffs
1 [3.80, 68.87] [27.28, 58.73] [18.84, 62.38] A,C A B > C > A B > A > C
2 [23.03, 65.87] [6.49, 73.06] [29.97, 63.42] A,B,C C C > A > B C > B > A
3 [33.92, 78.13] [25.48, 80.78] [10.44, 88.77] B,C C A > B > C A > C > B
4 [33.50, 77.04] [41.94, 73.39] [18.46, 83.53] A,B,C B B > A > C B > C > A
5 [1.52, 79.85] [16.56, 71.86] [25.00, 69.21] A,B A C > B > A C > A > B
6 [33.17, 110.47] [50.61, 105.82] [18.13, 117.76] A,C C B > A > C B > C > A
7 [35.86, 69.31] [12.38, 78.95] [28.92, 71.76] A,B,C A A > C > B A > B > C
8 [32.78, 64.23] [9.30, 74.37] [24.34, 67.88] B,C B A > C > B A > B > C
9 [31.64, 86.94] [16.60, 94.93] [40.08, 84.29] A,B,C C C > A > B C > B > A
10 [20.82, 120.45] [35.86, 113.16] [53.30, 108.51] A,B A C > B > A C > A > B
Table 5: Construction of Experiments
The second through fourth columns show the support distributions. For example, if a participant chose environment
A in round 1, the environmental support was randomly drawn from the uniform distribution between 3.80 and 68.87.
The fifth column shows the available options. When only two options were available, subjects were told that the
other one had been chosen by one of the computer players. The sixth column shows the choice of environment that
maximized the expected equilibrium payoff given the available options. The seventh column shows the ranks of the
expectations, and the last column shows the ranks of the expected equilibrium payoffs.
Figure 2: Screen Capture of the First Stage of Round 3 in the Main Experiment
Subjects were informed that environment A had already been chosen by a competitor, so they chose either environment
B or environment C. Without any further action or calculation, they obtained the means and ex-ante advantages of
the support distributions. (The ex-ante advantages are the probabilities of winning when all the players invest 0.)
Since the mean of environment B is greater than that of environment C and the ex-ante advantage of environment C
is greater than that of environment B, they should have chosen environment C to maximize their expected payoff.
17
Figure 3: Screen Captures of the First Stage of Round 3 in the Supplementary Experiments
Left: A simulator that could be used to calculate the expected payoffs for any contingent set of effort choices. Subjects
could find a Nash equilibrium by carrying out a few operations with this simulator. Right: Any information that
could have been used as a guide was not provided.
ante advantages were almost the same. In rounds 3, 5, 6, 9, and 10, the third-tier environment’s
ex-ante advantage was slightly greater than that of the second-tier one. The environments were
displayed in random order, to prevent subjects from inferring the advantages of the environments
from their order on the display.
Subjects were also told that the two computer competitors would make their own optimal
investment decisions, and would assume that subjects would choose their best investment deci-
sions.18 Since subjects knew that the computer players’ investment choices were independent of
their choices, they did not worry about contingent decision changes of the other players. At the
end of every round, environmental supports were drawn from the respective distributions, and
subjects were informed whether they won and how much they earned (or lost). The computer
players’ investment choices were not divulged, because they always chose the same action when
given the same conditions.
Before participating in the experiments, subjects followed the instructions on the tutorial
screen and answered six multiple choice questions to check their understanding of the instruc-
tions. They were allowed to participate in the experiments only if all of their answers were
correct. See Appendix B for the screening test questions. 23 undergraduates failed to pass
the screening test. After passing the screening test, subjects played two practice rounds (one
18Some graduate participants may have recognized that I preset the two computer competitors to always choose
Nash equilibrium effort levels, but I did not want to make the task too complex for the subjects. I provided a
more detailed explanation whenever subjects did not fully understand the instructions. I focused on conveying two
messages: (1) Once a subject choses an environment, the other (computer) players were exclusively assigned to the
other environments. (2) The computer players’ unobserved investment levels were preset, so they would not change
their investment decisions no matter what the subject chose as his/her investment level.
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unrestricted and one restricted) without payment.
After the experiments, subjects were surveyed on their confidence in their decisions. This
follow-up survey consisted of the following two sets of two questions:
1.1. “Overall, which of the following is the closest description of your choices of environments?”
(followed by four sentences describing different levels of confidence)
1.2. “Overall, which of the following is the closest description of your choices of investments?”
(followed by four sentences describing different levels of confidence)
2.1. “Overall, how hard was it to choose an environment?” (followed by a five-level Likert
scale, from “very easy” to “very hard”)
2.2. “Overall, how hard was it to choose an investment level?” (followed by a five-level Likert
scale, from “very easy” to “very hard”)
5 Results
The main results from the lab experiments can be summarized as follows:
1. Subjects chose the optimal environment in 75.57% of the unrestricted rounds (529 out of
700 rounds). However, they chose the optimal environment in only 28.67% of the restricted
rounds (301 out of 1050 rounds). That is, subjects were likely to fall into the STT.
2. The 92 subjects who chose the optimal environment in all the unrestricted rounds were
more likely to fall into the STT. No one chose the optimal environment in all six restricted
rounds. In fact, those 92 subjects chose the optimal environment in only 16.67% of the
restricted rounds.
3. Those 92 subjects were more confident in their choices of environments, though they were
less likely than their counterparts to choose the optimal environment. They also reported
that choosing environments was an easier task than choosing investment levels.
Those observations strongly suggest that the STT consistently arose. The level of under-
standing of optimization problems did not help them to do better. There was no significant
difference between sessions with undergraduate students and those with graduate students.19 In
fact, the average payment for the graduate student sessions was slightly lower than that of the
undergraduate student sessions, and a slightly smaller proportion of graduate students chose
19Under a null hypothesis of the same proportion of the correct environment choices, the t-statistic of the proportion
difference of the two subgroups is 0.4335.
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the optimal environment, though differences in choice patterns between undergraduate and
graduate subjects were not significant.20 Also there was no noticeable difference by gender.21
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Game Type R U R U R R U R U R
SPNE (A,7) (C,16) (C,5) (B,17) (A,5) (C,3) (A,16) (B,7) (C,12) (A,3)
Mode (env. choice) C C B B B A A C C B
Correct decision (%) 20.00 74.86 33.14 78.86 34.29 32.00 73.14 20.00 75.43 32.57
Avg. inv. choice 13.73 16.19 15.42 16.69 14.19 14.51 16.21 14.41 16.34 14.55
Overinvestment 5.10 5.66 8.96 5.13 7.83 10.67 5.84 5.72 8.39 10.35
Table 6: Summary: All Subjects
This table shows how well subjects did in finding the environment that maximized their expected payoff in equilibrium.
In the second row, R stands for a restricted round and U stands for an unrestricted round. The third row shows the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy for the given constraints, where the first entity is the optimal environment
choice and the second one is the optimal investment choice. The fourth row shows the most frequently chosen
environment. The fifth row shows the proportion of subjects who chose the optimal environment. The sixth row
shows the average of the individual investment choices. In the last row, overinvestment is the mean difference between
the optimal investment choices for the players’ chosen environments and their actual investment choices.
Table 6 shows some basic descriptive statistics about subjects’ environment choices by round.
The fifth row of the table shows the proportion of subjects who chose the optimal environment.
For the unrestricted rounds, denoted by U in the table, their choices were quite good overall:
In each unrestricted round, 73.14% or more of subjects chose the environment which gave the
highest expected payoff in equilibrium. However, for the restricted rounds, denoted by R in
the table, subjects’ choices were surprisingly incorrect. Up to 80.00% of subjects chose the
environment which did not provide the highest expected payoff in equilibrium.22 See Figure 4.
One possible concern is that experiment participants may have made their environment
choices randomly. Since the variances of the environmental supports were large enough to pre-
vent any player from having a winning probability close to 1,23 and the monetary prize was not
large enough to bring about a sizable loss in case of a wrong choice of environment, some of
the subjects may simply have wanted to make random choices or to make “unusual” choices
(unusual from their perspective). To address this concern, in Table 7 I provide summary statis-
tics on the cohort of subjects who made the correct environment choices in all the unrestricted
20The undergraduate subjects chose the optimal environment in 30.44% of the restricted rounds, while the graduate
subject chose it in 27.78% of the rounds.
21Under a null hypothesis of the same proportion of the correct environment choices, the t-statistic of the proportion
difference between males and females is 0.2214.
22My model does not explicitly consider risk aversion, but if that were taken into account, the accuracy of the
subjects’ choices would be even lower, because they could have attained a more stable income stream by choosing the
third-tier environment and a smaller investment level.
23The experiment was designed in a way that even when the third-tier player invests all the 40 tokens and the other
players invest 0 tokens, it is still possible that the third-tier player loses due to the high variance of the environmental
supports.
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Figure 4:
The blue (red) line shows the proportion of subjects who chose the optimal environment in the unrestricted (restricted)
rounds. In the unrestricted rounds, 73.14% or more of subjects chose the environment which gave the highest expected
payoff in equilibrium. In the restricted rounds, however, subjects’ choices were in general incorrect. Up to 80.00% of
subjects chose the environment which did not provide the highest expected payoff in equilibrium. The dashed line
shows the environment choices of the subjects who made the correct choice in all the unrestricted rounds; they did
poorer in the restricted rounds.
rounds. I call them the ACU (Always Correct in the Unrestricted rounds) subjects. Note that
they did poorer in the restricted rounds. See the dashed line in Figure 4. When it came to the
investment choices, the subjects overinvested in every round on average. The last row in Tables
6 and 7 shows how subjects’ investment choices differed from the Nash equilibrium investment
given their environment choices. The ACU subjects’ overinvestments were slightly smaller for all
the rounds, but not significant enough to conclude that in general the ACU subjects exercised
greater discretion in their individual investment choices.
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Game Type R U R U R R U R U R
SPNE (A,7) (C,16) (C,5) (B,17) (A,5) (C,3) (A,16) (B,7) (C,12) (A,3)
Mode (env. choice) C C B B B A A C C B
Correct decision (%) 5.43 100.00 21.74 100.00 22.83 22.83 100.00 6.52 100.00 20.65
Avg. inv. choice 13.54 16.79 15.86 17.79 13.80 14.11 17.15 14.12 16.50 13.77
Overinvestment 3.89 4.89 8.88 4.58 6.89 10.09 5.25 4.58 7.34 9.32
Table 7: Summary: The ACU Subjects Only
This table is the equivalent of Table 6 for the subjects who made the optimal choice of environment in all the
unrestricted rounds. In each of the restricted rounds, the proportion of subjects who chose the optimal environment
was rather small.
Some participants, especially the ACU subjects, may have set their own rule of thumb and
strictly followed it. As stated in the previous section, any single statistic which summarizes
the environmental distributions—either separately or jointly—cannot provide a consistent way
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of predicting the ranks of the expected payoffs in equilibrium. That is, no matter what a
participant’s simple rule of thumb was,24 their rule was wrong. Under this interpretation, the
STT affected such participants even more severely because they consistently chose the second
tier without contemplation and then backed up their (wrong) choices with overinvestment. The
combination of these two mistakes, the wrong choices of environment and the overinvestments,
caused them to have even lower expected payoffs.
Another observation may help to minimize any concern about whether the subjects used a
simple, primitive rule of thumb to make their environment choices in earlier rounds and then
modified their rule based on their previous experience. In 1,057 of the 1,400 “repeat” rounds (i.e.,
those other than the first unrestricted round and the first restricted round for each participant),
the subject’s choice of environment was consistent with that in their previous round.25 Among
the 343 repeat rounds where they made a choice of environment that was inconsistent with
their previous choice, 172 were from the first half of the eight repeat rounds, and 171 were from
the second half. That is, I found no compelling evidence that subjects had modified their own
decision rules about the choice of environment as a result of their experience on earlier rounds.
Though analysis of investment patterns was not the primary purpose of my experiments, at
least two interesting observations are worth noting. One of these is that subjects’ overinvestment
levels were statistically significant at the 5% level. That is, subjects tended to overinvest
when they believed either that they were likely to be a runner-up or that they had chosen an
advantageous environment. A common finding in the rank-order tournament literature is that
theory does a good job of predicting the average effort level in tournament experiments (Bull,
Schotter, and Weigelt, 1987; Schotter and Weigelt, 1992; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2011; Agranov
and Tergiman, 2013). To the best of my knowledge, there have been no reports of overinvestment
behavior with heterogeneous environmental supports in rank-order tournaments.26 The other
interesting observation is that risk-seeking behavior after a previous loss was associated with
a loss in competition, not in payoff. Note that in this experiment, it is possible for the player
to lose the competition but have a positive payoff. Observations in other contexts of choice
24If a rule of thumb was used by an ACU, we cannot identify whether it was the mean or a lower bound of the
environmental support distribution. Note that I set the environmental distributions in such a way that a distribution
with a higher mean has a smaller variance, so that the STT could arise. In the experiment, all the environmental
support distributions were uniform, so the ranks of the means are consistent with the ranks of the lower bounds of
the uniform distributions.
25(Un)restricted rounds were compared with previous (un)restricted ones.
26I also looked at individuals who chose the second-best environment in at least one of the six restricted rounds
and the second-tier environment in at least one of them, and found that the average investment level when they chose
the second-tier environment (14.72 tokens) was higher than that when they chose the second-best environment (13.98
tokens). However, the difference is not statistically significant (t-statistic: 0.8065, n1 = 341, n2 = 277).
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under uncertainty (Weber and Zuchel, 2005; Langer and Weber, 2008; Andrade and Iyer, 2009)
suggest that subjects become more risk averse after a “paper” loss in payoff.27 See Table 8.
When the subjects in my experiments lost the competition in the previous round, they tended to
overinvest by 1.93 tokens more than their previous overinvestment level, while they overinvested
by 0.89 tokens less than their previous overinvestment level if they won the competition in the
previous round. Subjects who lost in competition but gained in payoff in the previous round
overinvested by 3.75 tokens more than their previous overinvestment level. On average, subjects
who had a loss in payoff in the previous round overinvested by 2.70 tokens less than their previous
overinvestment level, while those who gained in the previous round overinvested by 1.15 tokens
more than their previous overinvestment level. However, this observation cannot be considered
as a direct contribution to the literature on changes in risk attitude, because the structure of
each round varied and each round could therefore be understood as a separate task.
Changes in overinvestment∗ at round t
Loss in competition in round t− 1 1.93
Win in competition in round t− 1 −0.89
Loss in payoff in round t− 1 −2.70
Gain in payoff in round t− 1 1.15
Loss in competition + gain in payoff in round t− 1 3.75
Win in competition + loss in payoff in round t− 1 —
Table 8: Risk Attitude after a Previous Loss in Competition/Payoff
(*) The overinvestment level is defined as the actual investment level minus the optimal investment level given the
subject’s choice of environment. Therefore, changes in overinvestment may not directly imply changes in investment.
Positive (negative) changes in overinvestment can be understood as the subjects’ becoming risk-seeking (risk-averse)
after a previous event.
The results of the follow-up survey are summarized in Table 9. The ACU subjects were more
confident than the other subjects in their environment choices and more likely to report that the
environment choices were easy. 76.09% of the ACU subjects answered that the closest descrip-
tion of their environment choices was “consistently right” or “in general right, except perhaps
on only a few rounds,” while only 58.33% of the non-ACU subjects chose one of those answers.
Similarly, 54.35% of the ACU subjects found the environment choices “very easy” or “easy,”
while 34.52% of the others chose one of those answers. For similarly paired questions about
27Imas (2014) reports mixed findings in regard to the influence of prior losses on risk attitudes, and shows that
individuals become risk averse after losses are realized while they become risk seeking if a loss has not been realized
(that is, a paper loss). In my experiments, subjects were informed of their wins/losses in competition and their
gains/losses in payoff after every round, but the payoffs were realized only at the end of the game. In the winner-take-
all contest, the level of overinvestment may have captured subjects’ attitude toward risk, since the optimal level of
investment was calculated under an assumption of risk neutrality. If a subject invested more (less) than the optimal
level, s/he decreased the expected payoff but expanded (reduced) the variance of possible earnings. Therefore, the
positive (negative) changes in overinvestment imply that s/he became more risk-seeking (risk-averse).
23
individual investment choices, there were no noticeable differences between the ACU subjects
and non-ACU subjects, except that a larger proportion of the non-ACU subjects answered that
the investment choices were easy, at the 10% level of statistical significance. I acknowledge that
this between-group comparison may not have captured the individual heterogeneity in subjects’
self-evaluation, so the simplest difference-in-differences estimator is also provided. Since the
survey consisted of two sets of two questions each, I first calculated the difference between an-
swers to the questions within each set. For example, if a subject answered that her environment
choices were “consistently right” but her investment choices were “in general right, maybe one
or two tokens more or less,” then I counted her as having more confidence in her environment
choices than in her investment choices. Similarly, if a subject answered that her environment
choices were “easy” and her investment choices were “neither easy nor hard,” then I counted her
as considering that making the environment choices was the easier of the two tasks. Differences
in these differences between the ACU subjects and the others are positive. That is, even after
controlling for individual heterogeneity, we still observe that the ACU subjects were more likely
than the others to feel that the environment choices were easier than the investment choices.
These differences were tested under the null hypothesis of the same population mean.
The ACU subjects’ stronger confidence in their environment choices could have lead to a
larger loss in payoff. If a subject lost in competition, then there are three possible reasons why
she lost: Her environment choice might be was wrong, she should have invested more, or she just
had bad luck. Since the ACU subjects were more confident in environment choices, and unless
they believe they are always unlucky, they would have been likely to consider investing more,
or at least would have been tempted to blame themselves for not exerting more effort (i.e., for
not investing enough) rather than contemplating their environment choices. The experimental
evidence confirms this conjecture: On average, the ACU subjects’ overinvestment level for the
lost restricted rounds was 6.82 tokens, while that of the non-ACU subjects was 3.99 tokens.
The difference was statistically significant (t-test statistic: 3.6148, n1 = 313, n2 = 352).
6 Conclusions
This paper’s theoretical results can be summarized as follows: In a pairwise competition,
only the first moment of the environmental supports matters, so the equilibrium payoffs reflect
only the expected environmental supports. That is, a decision maker needs no information
other than the expected environmental supports when there are only two life choices. With
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Survey Question
Positive answers (%)1 differences
ACU non-ACU (% points)
1.1. How confident in your environment choices? 76.09 58.33 17.75∗∗∗
1.2. How confident in your investment choices? 65.22 63.10 2.12
2.1. How easy were environment choices? 54.35 34.52 19.82∗∗∗
2.2. How easy were investment choices? 11.96 21.43 −9.47∗
Positive differences (%)2 difference-in-differences
ACU non-ACU (% points)
More confident in environment choices3 31.52 26.19 5.33
Easier in environment choices3 65.22 40.74 24.48∗∗∗
Table 9: Summary: Survey
*,**,***: 10%, 5%, 1% level of statistical significance.
1. For questions 1.1 and 1.2, this shows the proportion of subjects who answered that the closest description of their
environment choices (investment choices) was “consistently right” or “in general right, except perhaps on only a few
rounds.” For questions 2.1 and 2.2, it shows the proportion of subjects who answered “very easy” or “easy.”
2. Questions 1.1 and 1.2, and questions 2.1 and 2.2, are paired, to capture the difference between answers in each pair.
3. After controlling for individual heterogeneity, we observe that the ACU subjects were more confident in their
environment choices and found the environment choices easier. The differences were tested under the null hypothesis
of the same population mean.
three players, the second moment of the environmental supports is also significant in deter-
mining the ranks of the equilibrium payoffs. The second-tier trap arises when the second-tier
player is less competitive than the third-tier player in terms of the second moment and less
competitive than the first-tier player in terms of the first moment. A sufficient condition for
the STT is that the ex-ante advantage of the third-tier environment be at least as large as that
of the second-tier environment. That is, a decision maker needs no information other than the
expected environmental supports and the ex-ante advantages, and should choose the third-tier
environment over the second-tier one when the ex-ante advantages of the second- and third-tier
environments are similar. When it comes to the counterfactual analysis of an individual’s life
choices, it suggests that when the first-best option is unavailable, or the decision maker is not
accepted for belonging to the first-best environment, it is wise to consider more than just the
tiers. The experimental evidence strongly supports that players can easily be tempted to make
the wrong decision in choosing their environments: The majority of subjects chose the environ-
ment with the largest available expectation of the environmental support, regardless of whether
a simulator for payoff calculation was provided. A significant proportion of participants in my
experiments failed to choose the better of two environments in terms of the maximum expected
payoff in equilibrium when they were not given the option of choosing the best environment of
the three, though they were fairly good at choosing the best environment. The results imply
that following a simple rule of thumb based on one summary statistic, the mean, could result
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in the second-best player being worse off.
There are many potential directions for further research to extend this study. From the
theoretical perspectives, I assumed in this study that players are identical in terms of the cost
of their effort, so the first-stage matching becomes trivial. Considering a sequential competition
with history-dependent human capital accumulation which affects the cost of the effort could be
challenging but may address more of the issues that are relevant to real-life situations. Another
key assumption of this paper was the winner-take-all payoff structure. It is worth investigating
other forms of reward structures, for example, a combination of rewards and punishments as
considered in Moldovanu, Sela, and Shi (2012) or Kamijo (2016), to see if those would yield the
similar results. For further experiments, asking subjects to report the complete order of their
environment preferences could help us relate those preferences to their effort choices. It would be
worth doing a between-subject study with two treatments, one with the unrestricted framework
and the other with the restricted framework, so that we could more rigorously identify the
changes in investment behavior caused by the outcomes of previous events.
Appendix A
Proof of existence of a Nash equilibrium:
Note that players would not exert more effort than e¯ such that c(e¯) = w, as that would def-
initely yield a negative expected payoff. Define BR(e) = (BR1(e−1), . . . , BRn(e−n)), where
e = (e1, . . . , en) ∈ [0, e¯]n ≡ S. Since S is a nonempty, closed, bounded, and convex subset of
Rn, and BR(e) is a upper-semi continuous self-map on S, by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem
there exists e∗ ∈ S such that BR(e∗) = e∗.
In the proof of Proposition 1, I will use the following observations and Lemma 1.
Observations. Suppose g1(θ) and g2(θ) are unimodal symmetric probability distributions with
means E(θ1) and E(θ2), respectively. For Observations 1–4, suppose E(θ1) > E(θ2).
1. Since
∫
g1(θ)dθ =
∫
g2(θ)dθ = 1,
∫
g1(θ)g2(θ)dθ can be interpreted as a weighted average
of g1 weighted by g2, or a weighted average of g2 weighted by g1.
2. For Gi(x) =
∫ x
−∞ gi(θ)dθ, i = 1, 2,
∫
Gi(θ)gi(θ)dθ =
1
2 .
3.
∫
(G2(θ)−G1(θ))g1(θ)dθ > 0.
4.
∫
(g1(θ)− g2(θ))G1(θ)dθ > 0.
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Suppose now that E(θ1) = E(θ2).
5. Consider a location shift parameter e ∈ R. ∫ g1(θ − e)g2(θ)dθ is maximized at e = 0.
Proof: The first observation is trivial. The second observation follows from integration by
parts:
∫
Gi(θ)gi(θ)dθ = [Gi(θ)Gi(θ)]
∞
−∞ −
∫
gi(θ)Gi(θ)dθ ⇒ 2
∫
Gi(θ)gi(θ)dθ = 1. The third
observation may be nontrivial. Since we assumed that the support distributions are symmetric
and unimodal, there are only two possible cases with E(θ1) > E(θ2): either θ1 is first-order
stochastically dominant (FOSD) over θ2, or G1 and G2 satisfy the single-crossing property, that
is, there is θ∗ such that for θ ≥ θ∗, G1(θ) ≥ G2(θ), and for θ < θ∗, G2(θ) > G1(θ). If θ1 is
FOSD over θ2, then G2(θ)−G1(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ and G2(θ)−G1(θ) > 0 for some θ, so
∫
(G2(θ)−
G1(θ))g1(θ)dθ > 0. If G2(θ) single-crosses G1(θ) at θ
∗, then θ∗ must be greater than E(θ1).
This is because Gi(E(θi)) =
1
2 , i = 1, 2, and G2(E(θ1)) > G1(E(θ1)). Then
∫ θ∗
−∞ g1(θ)dθ >∫∞
θ∗ g1(θ)dθ, so G2(θ) > G1(θ) for all θ < θ
∗, and
∫ θ∗
−∞(G2(θ)−G1(θ))dθ >
∫∞
θ∗ (G1(θ)−G2(θ))dθ.
Therefore,
∫
(G2(θ)−G1(θ))g1(θ)dθ =
∫ θ∗
−∞(G2(θ)−G1(θ))g1(θ)dθ−
∫∞
θ∗ (G1(θ)−G2(θ))g1(θ)dθ >
0. The fourth observation follows from the second and third observations. Using integration by
parts,
∫
(G2(θ) − G1(θ))g1(θ)dθ = [(G2(θ)−G1(θ))G1(θ)]∞−∞ −
∫
(g2(θ) − g1(θ))G1(θ)dθ = 0 +∫
(g1(θ)−g2(θ))G1(θ)dθ > 0. The fifth observation states that the integral of the product of two
symmetric probability distributions is maximized when they peak at the same point. The first-
order condition on maxe
∫
g1(θ− e)g2(θ)dθ is
∫ −dg1(θ−e)de g2(θ)dθ = ∫ dg1(θ˜)dθ˜ g2(θ˜+ e)dθ˜ = 0. The
first equality follows from the change of variables θ˜ = θ−e. Since dg1(θ)dθ is an odd function about
E(θ), and g2(θ) is an even function about E(θ),
∫ dg1(θ)
dθ g2(θ)dθ = 0. This observation is useful
for evaluating
∫
g1(θ − e)g2(θ)dθ even when E(θ1) and E(θ2) are different. If E(θ1) > E(θ2),
then
∫
g1(θ−e)g2(θ)dθ is maximized when e = E(θ2)−E(θ1). Also,
∫
g1(θ−e)g2(θ)dθ is smaller
(greater) than
∫
g1(θ)g2(θ)dθ for e > 0 (for E(θ2)− E(θ1) < e < 0).
Lemma 1. If E(θ1) > E(θ2), then
∫
G2(θ)g1(θ)dθ >
∫
G1(θ)g2(θ)dθ.
Proof:
∫
G2(θ)g1(θ)dθ >
∫
G1(θ)g1(θ)dθ =
∫
G1(θ)(g1(θ)−g2(θ)+g2(θ))dθ =
∫
G1(θ)g2(θ)dθ+∫
G1(θ)(g1(θ) − g2(θ))dθ >
∫
G1(θ)g2(θ)dθ , where the first inequality is from Observation 3
and the last inequality is from Observation 4.
Proof of Proposition 1
[⇒] First, assume E(θ1) > E(θ2). Since E(θ1) > E(θ2) implies
∫
G2(x)g1(x)dx >
∫
G1(x)g2(x)dx
by Lemma 1, player 1’s expected utility is always greater than or equal to that of player 2 at
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an equilibrium. Note that if the two players choose the same level of effort, then their ex-
pected rewards will be exactly the same as their ex-ante advantages, the probability of win-
ning when everyone chooses no effort, that is, E[Ri(e|θi, θj , e)] =
∫
Gj(θ + e − e)gi(θ)dθ =∫
Gj(θ)gi(θ)dθ, where the value of the prize, w, is normalized to 1. Then EU
∗
1 (e
∗
1|θ1, θ2, e∗2) =
maxe1 EU1(e1|θ1, θ2, e∗2) ≥ EU1(e∗2|θ1, θ2, e∗2) =
∫
G2(θ)g1(θ)dθ − c(e∗2) >
∫
G1(θ)g2(θ)dθ −
c(e∗2) = EU∗2 (e∗2|θ2, θ1, e∗2). In other words, if player 2 chooses an effort level e2, then player
1’s expected utility can always be greater by exerting the same level of effort, resulting in a
higher winning probability with the same cost of effort. Since this effort choice e2 is attainable
for player 1, his maximized expected utility must be at least as large as the expected utility
when he chooses e2.
[⇐] If E[R1(e∗1|θ1, θ2, e∗2)]− c(e∗1) > E[R2(e∗2|θ2, θ1, e∗1)]− c(e∗2), then it is trivial to show that
E(θ1) > E(θ2) if we can prove that e
∗
1 ≥ e∗2 in equilibrium. Suppose for the sake of contradiction
that E(θ1) ≤ E(θ2). Then (e∗1, e∗2) is not an equilibrium, because this case (E(θ1) ≤ E(θ2) and
E[R1(e
∗
1|θ1, θ2, e∗2)]− c(e∗1) > E[R2(e∗2|θ2, θ1, e∗1)]− c(e∗2)) holds only when e∗2 > e∗1. Thus all that
remains is to show that e∗1 ≥ e∗2 in equilibrium.
For the two-player competition, player i’s first-order condition is
∫
gj(θ + ei − e∗j )gi(θ)dθ =
c′(ei), where the value of the prize, w, is normalized to 1. Similarly, player j’s first-order
condition is
∫
gi(θ+ ej − e∗i )gj(θ)dθ = c′(ej). When ei = e∗ = ej , both first-order conditions are
satisfied. Therefore (e∗i , e
∗
j ) with e
∗
i = e
∗
j is an equilibrium. This is not necessarily the only Nash
equilibrium, because we have not checked whether (e∗1, e∗2) with e∗1 6= e∗2 can be an equilibrium.
My goal is to show that e∗2 > e∗1 cannot be an equilibrium. Suppose for the sake of contra-
diction that (eˆ1, eˆ2) with eˆ2 > eˆ1 is an equilibrium. Let ε = eˆ2− eˆ1 > 0. Since c′(·) is monotone
increasing,
∫
g1(θ + ε)g2(θ)dθ = c
′(eˆ2) > c′(eˆ1) =
∫
g2(θ − ε)g1(θ)dθ. eˆ2 > eˆ1 also implies that
when player 2 chooses eˆ1, the marginal benefit is greater than the marginal cost, that is,
∫
g1(θ+
eˆ1− eˆ1)g2(θ)dθ ≥ c′(eˆ1), or
∫
g1(θ)g2(θ)dθ ≥ c′(eˆ1) =
∫
g2(θ− ε)g1(θ)dθ. This is a contradiction
for ε ∈ (0, 2(E(θ1)−E(θ2))). Note that
∫
g2(θ − ε)g1(θ)dθ is maximized at ε = E(θ1)−E(θ2),
by the proof of Observation 5. When ε = 2(E(θ1)−E(θ2)), by symmetry
∫
g2(θ − ε)g1(θ)dθ =∫
g2(θ)g1(θ)dθ. Thus for ε ∈ (0, 2(E(θ1) − E(θ2))),
∫
g2(θ − ε)g1(θ)dθ >
∫
g2(θ)g1(θ)dθ. Sim-
ilarly, when player 1 chooses eˆ2, the marginal benefit is smaller than the marginal cost, that
is,
∫
g2(θ + eˆ2 − eˆ2)g1(θ)dθ ≤ c′(eˆ2), or
∫
g2(θ)g1(θ)dθ ≤ c′(eˆ2) =
∫
g1(θ + ε)g2(θ)dθ. This is a
contradiction for ε > 2(E(θ1)− E(θ2)), because
∫
g2(θ)g1(θ)dθ >
∫
g1(θ + ε)g2(θ)dθ. It is also
a contradiction for ε = 2E(θ1)− 2E(θ2), because c′(eˆ2) =
∫
g1(θ + 2E(θ1)− 2E(θ2))g2(θ)dθ =
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∫
g2(θ− 2E(θ1) + 2E(θ2))g1(θ)dθ = c′(eˆ1) but c′(eˆ2) > c′(eˆ1). The second equality follows from
the change of variables θ′ = θ + 2E(θ1)− 2E(θ2). Therefore, in equilibrium e∗1 ≥ e∗2.
Lemma 2. Suppose E(θ1) = E(θ2) = E(θ3) = µ, and θ
′
2 is a mean-preserving spread of θ2.
Then
∫
G1(θ)
2(g2(θ)− g′2(θ))dθ < 0 and
∫
G1(θ)G3(θ)(g2(θ)− g′2(θ))dθ < 0.
Proof: First, I show that
∫
G1(θ)g
′
2(θ)dθ =
∫
G1(θ)g2(θ)dθ = 1/2, to illustrate the tools
I used in the proof of this lemma. G1(θ) is mirror-imaged about (µ, 1/2), that is, for any
 > 0, G1(µ − ) = 1 − G1(µ + ). In addition, g2(θ) and g′2(θ) are symmetric about µ, that
is, for any  > 0, g2(µ − ) = g2(µ + ) and g′2(µ − ) = g′2(µ + ). Then
∫
G1(θ)g2(θ)dθ =∫ µ
−∞G1(θ)g2(θ)dθ +
∫∞
µ G1(θ)g2(θ)dθ =
∫∞
0 G1(µ− )g2(µ− )d+
∫∞
0 G1(µ+ )g2(µ+ )d =∫∞
0 G1(µ− )g2(µ+ )d+
∫∞
0 G1(µ+ )g2(µ+ )d =
∫∞
0 (G1(µ− ) +G1(µ+ ))g2(µ+ )d =∫∞
0 g2(µ + )d =
1
2 . This holds for any symmetric probability distribution about µ, including
g′2(θ). Thus,
∫
G1(θ)g
′
2(θ)dθ =
1
2 .
G1(θ)
2 is not mirror-imaged about (µ, 1/2). For any  > 0, G1(µ− ) +G1(µ+ ) = 1, but
G1(µ− )2 +G1(µ+ )2 < 1. (For example, consider a uniform distribution from 0 to 1 whose
mean is 0.5. Then (0.5− 0.2)2 = 0.09 < 1− (0.5 + 0.2)2 = 0.51.) When θ′2 is a mean-preserving
spread of θ2, there must be d > 0 such that g2(θ) ≥ g′2(θ) for θ ∈ [µ−d, µ+d], and g′2(θ) > g2(θ)
for θ > µ+ d and θ < µ− d. Define h(θ) = g2(θ)− g′2(θ). Then h(θ) is symmetric about µ and
limθ→−∞ h(θ) = limθ→∞ h(θ) = h(µ− d) = h(µ+ d) = 0. h(θ) is positive for θ ∈ [µ− d, µ+ d]
and negative otherwise. Moreover,
∫∞
µ h(θ)dθ =
∫∞
µ g2(θ)dθ −
∫∞
µ g
′
2(θ)dθ =
1
2 − 12 = 0. Thus,
∫
G1(θ)
2(g2(θ)− g′2(θ))dθ =
∫
G1(θ)
2h(θ)dθ =
∫ µ
−∞
G1(θ)
2h(θ)dθ +
∫ ∞
µ
G1(θ)
2h(θ)dθ
=
∫ ∞
0
G1(µ− )2h(µ− )d+
∫ ∞
0
G1(µ+ )
2h(µ+ )d
=
∫ ∞
0
(G1(µ− )2 +G1(µ+ )2)h(µ+ )d <
∫ ∞
0
h(µ+ )d =
∫ ∞
µ
h(θ)dθ = 0.
Here G1(θ)
2 = G1(θ)G1(θ) could be replaced with the product of two different cumulative
distributions. Suppose θ3 is another symmetric probability distribution with mean µ. Then∫
G1(θ)G3(θ)(g2(θ) − g′2(θ))dθ < 0. The proof is analogous after replacing G1(µ − )2 with
G1(µ− )G3(µ− ).
Proof of Proposition 2
Let θ′i be a mean-preserving spread of θi. Denote the pdf of θ
′
i by g
′
i(θ), so
∫
θgi(θ)dθ = E(θi) =
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∫
θg′i(θ)dθ and
∫
θ2gi(θ)dθ <
∫
θ2g′i(θ)dθ. Also, let A
i
j be the ex-ante advantage of player j
with θ′i, that is, A
i
i =
∫
Gj(θ)Gk(θ)g
′
i(θ)dθ, and A
i
j =
∫
G′i(θ)Gk(θ)gj(θ)dθ, where i, j, and k
are distinct.
First, I show that
∫
Gj(θ)Gk(θ)(gi(θ)− g′i(θ))dθ < 0, or Ai < Aii, where i = 2, 3. By Lemma
2, we know it is true when E(θi) = E(θj) = E(θk) = µ. The one further step needed to complete
this proof is to show that Gj(E(θi) − )Gk(E(θi) − ) + Gj(E(θi) + )Gk(E(θi) + ) < 1. This
will consist of three cases, but the main argument will be similar to the following: “For strictly
positive A,B,C and D, if A+ C ≤ 1 and B +D ≤ 1, then AB + CD < 1.” (The proof of this
claim is as follows: AB+CD ≤ A(1−D)+(1−A)D. Redefine A = 0.5+δ, δ ∈ (−0.5, 0.5), and
D = 0.5+η, η ∈ (−0.5, 0.5). Then A(1−D)+(1−A)D = (0.5+δ)(0.5−η)+(0.5−δ)(0.5+η) =
0.5− 2δη < 1.)
Consider a mean-preserving spread of θ3, whose mean E(θ3) is the smallest of the three.
For  ∈ (0, E(θ1) − E(θ3)], G2(E(θ3) − )G1(E(θ3) − ) + G2(E(θ3) + )G1(E(θ3) + ) < 1
holds, because even at  = E(θ1) − E(θ3), G2(E(θ3) + ) < 1 and G1(E(θ3) + ) = 1/2.
Therefore, G2(E(θ3) + )G1(E(θ3) + ) < 1/2. For  > E(θ3) − E(θ1), and since (E(θ3) +
) − E(θ1) < E(θ1) − (E(θ3) − ), that is, E(θ3) +  is closer to E(θ1) than E(θ3) − , we find
G1(E(θ3) + ) − 1/2 < 1/2 − G1(E(θ3) − ), or G1(E(θ3) − ) + G1(E(θ3) + ) < 1. This also
holds for G2, so G2(E(θ3)− ) +G2(E(θ3) + ) < 1. Therefore, G2(E(θ3)− )G1(E(θ3)− ) +
G2(E(θ3) + )G1(E(θ3) + ) < 1.
Next, consider a mean-preserving spread of θ2, whose mean E(θ2) is between E(θ3) and
E(θ1). For  ∈ (0,min{E(θ1)−E(θ2), E(θ2)−E(θ3)}], G3(E(θ2)−)G1(E(θ2)−)+G3(E(θ2)+
)G1(E(θ2)+ ) < 1, because even at  = min{E(θ1)−E(θ2), E(θ2)−E(θ3)}, G3(E(θ2)+ ) < 1
and G1(E(θ2) + ) ≤ 1/2 (with equality when E(θ1) − E(θ2) ≤ E(θ2) − E(θ3)). Therefore,
G3(E(θ2) + )G1(E(θ2) + ) < 1/2. For  > min{E(θ1)−E(θ2), E(θ2)−E(θ3)}, similarly to the
case above, G1(E(θ2)− ) +G1(E(θ2) + ) < 1.
This approach will not work for θ1, whose mean E(θ1) is the highest of the three. For any
 > 0, G3(E(θ1)− ) +G3(E(θ1) + ) > 1 and G2(E(θ1)− ) +G2(E(θ1) + ) > 1. In this case,
G3(E(θ1)− )G2(E(θ1)− ) +G3(E(θ1) + )G2(E(θ1) + ) can be larger or smaller than 1.
Next, I show thatAij−Aj =
∫
(G′i(x)−Gi(x))Gk(x)gj(x)dx < 0. Since θ′i is a mean-preserving
spread of θi, G
′
i(x)−Gi(x) ≥ 0 for all x ≤ E(θi), and G′i(x)−Gi(x) ≤ 0 for all x > E(θi). Define
H(θ) = G′i(θ)−Gi(θ). Then H(θ) is symmetric about E(θi), so H(E(θi)− ) = −H(E(θi) + )
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for any  > 0. Thus,
∫
(G′3(θ)−G3(θ))G1(θ)g2(θ)dθ =
∫
H(θ)G1(θ)g2(θ)dθ
=
∫ E(θ3)
−∞
H(θ)G1(θ)g2(θ)dθ +
∫ ∞
E(θ3)
H(θ)G1(θ)g2(θ)dθ
=
∫ ∞
0
H(E(θ3)− )G1(E(θ3)− )g2(E(θ3)− )d+
∫ ∞
0
H(E(θ3) + )G1(E(θ3) + )g2(E(θ3) + )d
≤
∫ ∞
0
(H(E(θ3)− ) +H(E(θ3) + ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
max{G1(E(θ3)− )g2(E(θ3)− ), G1(E(θ3) + )g2(E(θ3) + )}dθ
= 0,
where equality holds only when G1(E(θ3) − )g2(E(θ3) − ) = G1(E(θ3) + )g2(E(θ3) + ) for
every , which is impossible with different means. Therefore,
∫
(G′3(θ)−G3(θ))G1(θ)g2(θ)dθ < 0,
or A31 −A1 < 0. A32 < A2, A21 < A1 and A23 < A3 can be shown analogously.
The marginal benefit for player i which would accrue from increasing the level of effort
is
∂
∫
Gj(θ+ei−ej)Gk(θ+ei−ek)gi(θ)dθ
∂ei
(if w is normalized to 1), and the marginal cost of increas-
ing the level of effort is c′(ei). While the marginal cost is independent of the spread of the
support distribution, the marginal benefit decreases, as θi has a larger variance. To prove
this, it suffices to show that
∫
Gj(θ + ei − ej)Gk(θ + ei − ek)(gi(θ) − g′i(θ))dθ is increasing
in ei. This is straightforward, because Gj(θ + ei − ej)Gk(θ + ei − ek) is increasing in ei,
and gi(θ) − g′i(θ) does not vary with ei. Therefore, ∂
∫
Gj(θ+ei−ej)Gk(θ+ei−ek)(gi(θ)−g′i(θ))dθ
∂ei
=
∂
∫
Gj(θ+ei−ej)Gk(θ+ei−ek)gi(θ)dθ
∂ei
− ∂
∫
Gj(θ+ei−ej)Gk(θ+ei−ek)g′i(θ)dx
∂ei
> 0. Since the marginal benefit
of effort is smaller while the marginal cost of effort is the same, e′∗i has to decrease. This argu-
ment also holds for e′∗j , j 6= i. Intuitively, a mean-preserving spread renders the effect of every
player’s effort less influential, so they would exert less effort.
Since a mean-preserving spread of θi drives increases in Ai, and since e
∗ decreases, as does
Aj for j 6= i, it is natural for EU ′∗i (e∗i |θ1, θ2, θ3, e∗−i) to increase. Even though the direction
of EU ′∗j is hard to determine from e
∗
j and A
i
j , we can at least conclude that EU
′∗
j cannot be
strictly larger than EU∗j . Suppose for the sake of contradiction that EU
′∗
j is strictly greater
than EU∗j . That would mean that player j could attain a higher expected payoff with a lower
ex-ante advantage. Since e′∗j ≤ e∗j , e′∗j is a feasible effort choice for player j. Therefore, e∗j cannot
be an equilibrium effort for player j.
Proof of Corollary 1
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Consider a shift of the location parameter, θ2
d
= θ˜3 + x, for a deterministic x > 0, so that
E(θ2)−E(θ˜3) = x > 0. Then E[R2(e∗2|θ1, θ2, θ˜3, e∗−2)]− c(e∗2) > E[R3(e∗3|θ1, θ2, θ˜3, e∗−3)]− c(e∗3),
because the second-tier player has already been given a positive amount of “effort,” x, for free.
Player 2’s expected payoff can be at least as large as that of player 3 by choosing e∗3. By Propo-
sition 2, EU∗3 is increasing and EU∗2 is decreasing in V ar(θ3). As V ar(θ3) goes to infinity, all
the effort choices approach 0, and A3 approaches 0.5, so EU
∗
3 eventually exceeds EU
∗
2 . Any
finite level of effort e ∈ [0, c−1(w)], where c−1(·) is an inverse function of c(·), cannot affect the
probability of winning as the variance of one of the environmental supports goes to infinity,
holding other two variances fixed. As the variance of θ3 goes to infinity, each player’s marginal
benefit of effort approaches zero as shown in the proof of Proposition 2. As they exerts less
effort, the expected payoff is more dependent to the ex-ante advantage. As V ar(θ3) goes to
infinity, the probability that the realization of θ3 is “extremer” than the realizations of θ1 and
θ2, that is, with 50% of chance the realization of θ3 is the largest, and with another 50% of
change it is the smallest.
Proof of Proposition 3
First, consider the case where the environmental support distributions of the second and third
tiers are identical. Denote the equilibrium effort choices in this case by ep = (ep1, e
p
2, e
p
3). Then
it is obvious that A2 = A3 and e
p
1 ≥ ep2 = ep3, just as in the pairwise competition. If the ex-ante
advantages of the second and third players are also identical, they will have the same expected
payoff, that is, EU2(e
p
2|θ1, θ2, θ3, ep−2) = EU3(ep3|θ1, θ2, θ3, ep−3). Next, consider increasing the
mean of θ2 and decreasing the variance of θ2 in such a way that E(θ2) > E(θ3) while keeping
A2 = A3. The smaller variance of the support will increase the marginal benefit of increasing
the level of effort, as shown in the proof of Proposition 2. Since the support distribution is
symmetric and unimodal, a positive location shift will cause the marginal benefit of increasing
the effort evaluated at ep2 to increase (or to remain the same when the distribution is uniform).
Therefore, the second-tier player will choose the higher level of effort. By Proposition 2, ep3 will
decrease but the expected reward will be unchanged. Hence the second-tier player will have
a smaller equilibrium payoff, and a support distribution that has a larger mean and a smaller
variance.
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Appendix B
Sample Experimental Instructions
[Have the participants sign in. Open the tutorial program.]
Welcome. This tutorial consists of instructions for the experiment, followed by a screening test
and two practice rounds. Your close attention is important to this study. Please read the in-
structions very carefully.
General description:
During the experiment, you will earn “points.” Your goal is to earn as many points as
possible. The points will be converted to U.S. dollars at the end of the experiment, at the rate
of 1,000 points = 1 USD. As a reward for your participation, you will be given 7,000 points at
the start of the experiment. The exact amount you will earn depends on your decisions, the
decisions of two virtual competitors, and some luck. The experiment will consist of 10 rounds,
each with two phases. In each round, you will have 40 virtual tokens. In general, your task is
to choose an “environment” in the first phase of each round, and then to choose an amount of
“individual investment” in the second phase. The details follow.
In the first phase of each round:
You will choose one of three environments, each of which is described by a range of num-
bers. At the end of the round, your chosen environment will randomly determine the amount
of “environmental support” you receive. For example, if you choose an environment described
as [3.44, 11.87], then at the end of the round your environment will randomly pick a number
between 3.44 and 11.87, which will be the environmental support. No two players can choose
the same environment, so your two competitors cannot choose the same environment you chose.
(Therefore, after one computer competitor chooses an environment, the other competitor will be
assigned the remaining one.) In some rounds, one environment may already have been chosen
by one of your competitors. In that case, you will choose one of the remaining two environments.
In the second phase of each round:
You will choose an amount of individual investment with the 40 tokens. Your “output” is
the sum of the environmental support you receive and your chosen individual investment.
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Calculating your payoff:
If your output is the largest of the three players, you will win 1600 points; otherwise, you will
win nothing. If you invest X tokens in the round, the cost of investment in terms of points is
X2, the square of X. The amount of your unused tokens, 40−X, will be converted to points at
the rate of 1 token = 10 points. Thus, your payoff for the round will be 1600−X2+(40−X)∗10
points if you win, and −X2 + (40−X) ∗ 10 points if you lose. Examples follow.
Examples:
Suppose you invest 10 tokens and your environmental support is 7.58. If your output, 17.58,
is the largest of the three players, you will win and earn 1600 points, but you will pay 100
points (the square of 10) as the cost of investment. Your 30 unused tokens will be converted
to 300 points. Therefore, your payoff for the round will be 1600 − 102 + (40 − 10) ∗ 10 =
1600− 100 + 300 = 1800 points if you win. If you lose, it will be −100 + 300 = 200 points.
Suppose instead that you invest 30 tokens. You will pay 900 points as the cost of investment.
The 10 unused tokens will be converted to 100 points. Your payoff will be 1600−900+100 = 800
points if you win, and −900 + 100 = −800 if you lose.
Though your points will automatically be updated to reflect the amount of the payoff, you
must understand how your payoff is determined. Three questions on the screening test will ask
you to calculate the payoff in hypothetical situations.
Other information:
Your virtual competitors will make their own best possible decisions given their environment,
and will assume that you will make your best decisions on investment choices in your chosen
environment. That is, their decision strategies are preset; they will not adjust their decisions
based on your investment. At the end of the round, you will be informed whether you have won
and how much you have earned (or lost). After you begin with 7,000 points in round 1, your
points in each new round will be cumulative. Please note that the cost of investment cannot
exceed the cumulative points you currently have. For example, if you have 400 points now, you
cannot invest more than 20 tokens, because the square of 20 is 400.
Now you will be given the screening test.
Screening Test:
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You will answer six multiple choice questions. You can participate in the experiment only
if ALL of your answers are correct. If you do not pass the screening test, you will be asked to
leave without payment. The main purpose of this screening test is to help you understand the
instructions, not to cause you any stress. It is okay for you to ask an experimenter to help you
if you are in doubt.
Q1 The experiment will consist of (A) rounds. In each round, you will have (B) tokens. You
will start with (C) points. What are the numbers (A), (B) and (C) that will make these
statements true?
Q2 Suppose you have 22,000 points at the end of the experiment. How much will you get paid
in cash?
Q3 Suppose you choose an environment described by the range [101.78, 200.30]. Which of
the following numbers CANNOT be your environmental support: 144.34, 199.00, 103.55,
204.23?
Q4 Assume that in the first round you invest 0 tokens and you win. What will your payoff
be?
Q5 Assume that in the first round you invest 20 tokens and you lose. What will your payoff
be?
Q6 Assume that in the first round you invest 14 tokens and you win. What will your payoff be?
[Let those who fail the screening test leave. The experiment begins.]
[The experiment ends. After filling out a short survey form, subjects leave with payments.]
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